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Abstract 
Earlier reports have described effects of child care policy on fertility and education investment in an 
endogenous fertility model. Nevertheless, these studies examine closed economies in which capital 
accumulation is achieved by saving or small open economies in which capital accumulation is not 
considered. We can regard a capital mobility model as another model for which capital accumulation 
in one country affects capital accumulation in another country. Our paper presents consideration of 
capital mobility and examines how child care policy in one country affects another country. Results 
show that child allowances and education subsidies positively or negatively affect human capital 
accumulation in the foreign country even if fertility and human capital accumulation can be raised in 
the country in which child care policies are provided. 
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1. Introduction 
Many studies have examined child care policy in an endogenous fertility model. Van Groezen, Leers 
and Meijdam (2003) derive that a child allowance can raise fertility in a small open economy. Zhang 
(1997) sets the model of quality and quantity of children with human capital and derives that a child 
allowance raises fertility and reduces human capital accumulation. However, the subsidy for education 
investment facilitates human capital accumulation and reduces fertility. 
Effects of child care policy are examined in the model of a small open economy or a closed 
economy as described in reports of the related literature. In a small open economy, physical capital 
accumulation is not considered. The interest rate and wage rate are constant over time. However, in a 
closed economy, physical capital accumulation is considered. The interest rate and wage rate depend 
on the level of physical capital stock. If child care policies change the level of the physical capital 
stock, then this change affects fertility and human capital accumulation. 
Van Groezen and Meijdam (2008), Fanti and Gori (2009), and others derive the effects of a 
child allowance on fertility in the closed economy model. Fanti and Gori (2009) show the negative 
effect of a child allowance on fertility attributable to a decrease in physical capital accumulation. 
Shintani and Yasuoka (2019) derives the effect of education subsidy on human capital accumulation 
in a closed economy as set by de la Croix and Doepke (2003). Compared with the case of a small open 
economy, in the case of closed economy, the positive effect of an education subsidy on human capital 
accumulation is weaker. 
This paper sets a two-country model with capital mobility and without labor mobility. Because 
of capital mobility, if the level of the physical capital stock changes in one country, then that in the 
other country changes because of arbitrage transactions. This is not considered in a small open 
economy or a closed economy. The study described in this paper examines derivation of the effects of 
child care policy on fertility and human capital accumulation in a two-country model. Results derived 
from the analyses described herein are presented below. If a child allowance is provided in one country, 
then fertility rises and human capital accumulation is prevented in this country at that time. However, 
human capital accumulation is facilitated over time because of an increase in physical capital 
accumulation. In foreign countries, human capital accumulation is positively affected. If a subsidy for 
education investment is provided in one country, then fertility decreases in this country. Human capital 
accumulation is facilitated in this country at that time. However, because of the negative effects of 
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physical capital accumulation, the positive effect on human capital accumulation is weakened in this 
country over time. In the other country, human capital accumulation is prevented. Results are not 
obtained for a closed economy or for a small open economy. 
The remainder of this paper is presented as follows. Section 2 sets the model. Section 3 derives 
the equilibrium. Section 4 presents examination of the effect of child allowance and subsidies for 
education investment in a two-country model. Final section concludes this paper. 
 
2. Model 
This model economy includes agents of three types: households, firms, and government. The 
individuals in households live in two periods: young and old. During the young period, they work 
inelastically to obtain labor income. Labor income is allocated to expenditures for child care, education 
investment for children, and savings for consumption during the old period. Then, the budget 
constraint in the young period can be shown as presented below. 
(1 − 𝜏)𝑤௧ℎ௧ = (𝑧௧ − 𝑞௧)𝑛௧ + (1 − 𝑥)𝑒௧𝑛௧ + 𝑠௧ (1) 
Therein, 𝑤௧ and ℎ௧ respectively denote the wage rate per effective labor and human capital stock. 
𝑧௧ represents the child care cost per capita. 𝑛௧ denotes the number of children (fertility). 𝑒௧ stands 
for the education investment for a child. 𝑠௧ represents the saving. 𝑞௧ and 𝑥 respectively signify the 
subsidy for the number of children and education investment. These subsidies are financed by the 
income tax. The tax rate is 𝜏. 𝑡 represents the period. 
During the old period, consumption is paid for by savings, as shown below. 
(1 + 𝑟௧ାଵ)𝑠௧ = 𝑐௧ାଵ (2) 
   Substituting (2) into (1), the lifetime budget constraint is obtainable as 
𝑐௧ାଵ
1 + 𝑟௧ାଵ
+ (𝑧௧ − 𝑞௧)𝑛௧ + (1 − 𝑥)𝑒௧𝑛௧ = (1 − 𝜏)𝑤௧ℎ௧. (3) 
The utility function is assumed as the following equation,1 
𝑢௧ = 𝛼𝑙𝑛𝑛௧ℎ௧ାଵ + (1 − 𝛼)𝑙𝑛𝑐௧ାଵ, 0 < 𝛼 < 1. (4) 
In that equation, ℎ௧ାଵ denotes the human capital in 𝑡 + 1 period. Also, ℎ௧ାଵ represents the human 
                                                   
1 Some utility forms of fertility and education exist. The utility function assumed for the analyses in this paper is the 
same as that of De la Croix and Doepke (2003). Zhang (1997) sets the dynasty model. The education investment raises 
the offspring utility. 
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capital of children. 
Human capital accumulation is assumed as 
ℎ௧ାଵ = 𝑒௧ఌℎ௧ଵିఌ, 0 < 𝜀 < 1. (5) 
 Then, the optimal allocations to maximize (4) subject to (3) and (5) can be derived as follows. 
𝑐௧ାଵ = (1 + 𝑟௧ାଵ)(1 − 𝜏)𝑤௧ℎ௧ (6) 
𝑒௧ =
𝜀(𝑧̅ − 𝑞ത)𝑤௧ℎ௧
(1 − 𝜀)(1 − 𝑥)
 (7) 
1 + 𝑔௧ =
ℎ௧ାଵ
ℎ௧
= ቆ
𝜀(𝑧 − 𝑞)𝑤௧
(1 − 𝜀)(1 − 𝑥)
ቇ
ఌ
 (8) 
𝑛௧ =
𝛼(1 − 𝜀)(1 − 𝜏)
𝑧̅ − 𝑞ത
 (9) 
 We assume 𝑧௧ = 𝑧̅𝑤௧ℎ௧ and 𝑞௧ = 𝑞ത𝑤௧ℎ௧, respectively.2  𝑔௧ denotes human capital growth rate, that 
is, income growth rate.  
  In this model economy, the product function is assumed as 
𝑌௧ = 𝐾௧ఏ𝐿௧ଵିఏ, 0 < 𝜃 < 1. (10) 
Therein, 𝑌௧, 𝐾௧, and 𝐿௧ respectively denote the output, capital stock and effective labor. Effective 
labor is given as 𝐿௧ = 𝑁௧ℎ௧. 𝑁௧ represents the population size of younger people. With a competitive 
market, the wage rate and interest rate are given as equal to marginal productivity. 
𝑤௧ = (1 − 𝜃)𝑘௧ఏ (11) 
1 + 𝑟௧ = 𝜃𝑘௧ఏିଵ (12) 
The capital stock is assumed to be fully depreciated in one period. 
Government subsidies are provided for the number of children and the education investment 
for children. With a balanced budget, the government budget constraint is given as shown below. 
𝜏𝑤௧ℎ௧ = 𝑞ത𝑤௧ℎ௧𝑛௧ + 𝑥𝑒௧𝑛௧  →  𝜏 = 𝑞ത𝑛௧ + 𝑥
𝑒௧𝑛௧
𝑤௧ℎ௧
  (13) 
 
3. Equilibrium in an open economy 
                                                   
2 If the child care cost 𝑧௧ is constant over time in the growth model, then the child care cost is small. The effect of 
cost vanishes. Therefore, we set the child care cost as the cost of the proportional wage rate. This child care cost, which 
is proportional to the wage rate, can be derived by considering the child care service sector as a two-sector model. 
However, for simplicity, we do not consider the child care service sector. 
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This model economy has two countries, A and B. In A country, child care policies are provided. 
However, B country has no child care policy. Between the two countries, capital mobility exists. 
However, labor supply can not move between the two countries. Defining 𝑦௧௜ as the variable 𝑦௧ in 𝑖 
country, the capital stock between the two countries is given as shown below. 
𝑟௧஺ = 𝑟௧஻  →  𝑘௧஺ = 𝑘௧஻ = 𝑘௧ (14) 
  The saving at 𝑡 period is presented below. 
(1 − 𝛼)൫(1 − 𝜏)𝑁௧஺ℎ௧஺ + 𝑁௧஻ℎ௧஻൯(1 − 𝜃)𝑘௧ఏ (15) 
  Defining 𝜇 as the share of the investment for capital stock between the two countries, 𝑘௧௜ is shown 
as 
𝑘௧ାଵ஺ =
𝐾௧ାଵ
𝑁௧ାଵ஺ ℎ௧ାଵ஺
=
𝜇(1 − 𝛼)൫(1 − 𝜏)𝑁௧஺ℎ௧஺ + 𝑁௧஻ℎ௧஻൯(1 − 𝜃)𝑘௧ఏ
𝑛஺𝑁௧஺(1 + 𝑔௧)஺ℎ௧஺
, (16) 
𝑘௧ାଵ஻ =
𝐾௧ାଵ
𝑁௧ାଵ஻ ℎ௧ାଵ஻
=
(1 − 𝜇)(1 − 𝛼)൫(1 − 𝜏)𝑁௧஺ℎ௧஺ + 𝑁௧஻ℎ௧஻൯(1 − 𝜃)𝑘௧ఏ
𝑛஻𝑁௧஻(1 + 𝑔௧)஻ℎ௧஻
, (17) 
where  
𝑛஺ =
𝛼(1 − 𝜀)(1 − 𝜏)
𝑧̅ − 𝑞ത
, (18) 
𝑛஻ =
𝛼(1 − 𝜀)
𝑧̅
, (19) 
(1 + 𝑔௧)஺ = ቆ
𝜀(𝑧̅ − 𝑞ത)𝑤௧
(1 − 𝜀)(1 − 𝑥)
ቇ
ఌ
, (20) 
(1 + 𝑔௧)஻ = ൬
𝜀𝑧̅𝑤௧
1 − 𝜀
൰
ఌ
. (21) 
We assume that ℎ௧஺ = ℎ௧஻ and 𝑁௧஺ = 𝑁௧஻ in 𝑡 period. 
  Because of 𝑘௧ାଵ஺ = 𝑘௧ାଵ஻ , 𝜇 can be derived as shown below. 
𝜇 =
1
𝑛஻(1 + 𝑔௧)஻
𝑛஺(1 + 𝑔௧)஺
+ 1
 (22) 
  Given 𝑘௧, ℎ௧஺, ℎ௧஻ , we can obtain 𝑘௧ାଵ஺ = 𝑘௧ାଵ஻ = 𝑘௧ାଵ from (14) and (16)–(22). Defining 𝑘௧஺ =
𝑘௧஻ = 𝑘 as the physical capital stock in the steady state. 𝑘 is given as (14) and (16)–(22). 
 
4. Policy Analysis 
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This paper presents an examination of how child care policies such as child allowances and education 
subsidies affect fertility and human capital accumulation in the two countries. Being different from a 
closed economy and a small open economy, this model economy demonstrates that the child case 
policies in one country affect the capital stock in another country. This paper presents consideration 
of country A as the country in which the child care policies are provided. Country B has no child care 
policies. 
 
4.1 Child Allowance 
If the child allowance is provided in country A, then the government budget constraint (13) is shown 
as 
𝜏 = 𝑞ത𝑛஺. (23) 
  Substituting (23) into (18), one can obtain the fertility in country A as 
𝑛஺ =
𝛼(1 − 𝜀)
𝑧̅ − ൫1 − 𝛼(1 − 𝜀)൯𝑞ത
. (24) 
  An increase in 𝑞ത raises fertility in A country at 𝑡 period. However, as shown by (20), (1 + 𝑔௧)஺ 
decreases at 𝑡 period. These results are the same as those in the case of a small open economy, as 
derived by Zhang (1997) and others. 
  Before the effect in 𝑡 + 1 period, we calculate ௗ௡
ಲ(ଵା௚೟)ಲ
ௗ௤ത
 at the approximation of 𝑞ത = 0 as 
𝑑𝑛஺(1 + 𝑔௧)஺
𝑑𝑞ത
= −
𝛼ଶ(1 − 𝜀)ଶ
𝑧̅ଶ
ቆ
𝜀𝑧̅(1 − 𝜃)𝑘௧ఏ
1 − 𝜀
ቇ
ఌ
< 0. (25) 
Therefore, we can obtain ௗఓ
ௗ௤ത
< 0 because of (22). The share of total investment for capital 
stock in country A decreases.3 Total differentiation of (16) with respect to 𝑘௧ାଵ஺ , 𝑛஺, (1 + 𝑔௧)஺, 𝜇, 
𝜏, 𝑞ത at the approximation of 𝑞ത, one can obtain ௗ௞೟శభ
ಲ
ௗఛ
 as 
𝑑𝑘௧ାଵ஺
𝑑𝑞ത
=
𝑘௧ାଵ஺
𝜇
𝑑𝜇
𝑑𝑞ത
−
𝜇(1 − 𝛼)(1 − 𝜃)𝑘௧ఏ
𝑛஺(1 + 𝑔௧)஺
𝑑𝜏
𝑑𝑞ത
−
𝑘௧ାଵ஺
𝑛஺(1 + 𝑔௧)஺
𝑑𝑛஺(1 + 𝑔௧)஺
𝑑𝑞ത
. (26) 
The sign of ௗ௞೟శభ
ಲ
ௗ௤ത
  is ambiguous because ௞೟శభ
ಲ
ఓ
ௗఓ
ௗ௤ത
< 0,  ఓ(ଵିఈ)(ଵିఏ)௞೟
ഇ
௡ಲ(ଵା௚೟)ಲ
ௗఛ
ௗ௤ത
> 0  and  
௞೟శభಲ
௡ಲ(ଵା௚೟)ಲ
ௗ௡ಲ(ଵା௚೟)ಲ
ௗఛ
< 0 . However, as shown by (17) and (22), we can obtain ௗ௞೟శభ
ಳ
ௗ௤ത
> 0  if the 
                                                   
3 Once the government provides a child allowance at country A, one can obtain 𝑘௧ାଵ஺ > 𝑘௧ାଵ஻  temporally. Then, the 
capital stock inflow occurs in country B. That is, 𝜇 decreases. 
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negative effect of 𝜏 on capital accumulation is small. Therefore, because of the arbitrage condition 
(14), it is consistent with ௗ௞೟శభ
ಲ
ௗ௤ത
> 0. As shown by (17), the income growth rate in country B at 𝑡 + 1 
period (1 + 𝑔௧)஻ increases. Because of 
ௗ௞೟శభಲ
ௗ௤ത
> 0 , the income growth rate in country A at 𝑡 + 1 
period (1 + 𝑔௧)஺ increases, too. Then, the following proposition can be established. 
 
Proposition 1 
Child allowance in country A raises the fertility and reduces income growth rate in country A. The 
income growth rate in country B increases in 𝑡 + 1 period if the negative effect of taxation on capital 
accumulation is small. 
 
When considering a closed economy or a small open economy, then no effect occurs in country B. 
However, because of the capital stock flow, the child allowance can affect income growth in country 
B. 
 
4.2 Education Subsidy 
If the education subsidy is provided in country A, the government budget constraint (13) is 
𝜏 = 𝑥
𝑒௧஺𝑛஺
𝑤௧ℎ௧஺
=
𝑥𝛼𝜀(1 − 𝜏)
1 − 𝑥
. (27) 
  In this case, the education subsidy reduces fertility and raises education investment in country A at 
𝑡 period.4 These results are the same with the case of small open economy as derived by Zhang (1997) 
and others. 
By substituting (27) into 𝑛஺(1 + 𝑔௧)஺, one can obtain the following equation: 
𝑛஺(1 + 𝑔௧)஺ =
𝛼(1 − 𝜀)(1 − 𝛼𝜀𝑥)
𝑧̅
൬
𝜀𝑧̅𝑤௧
(1 − 𝜀)(1 − 𝑥)
൰
ఌ
. (28) 
  Before the effect in 𝑡 + 1 period, we calculate ௗ௡
ಲ(ଵା௚೟)ಲ
ௗ௤ത
 at the approximation of 𝑥 = 0 as 
𝑑𝑛஺(1 + 𝑔௧)஺
𝑑𝑥
= 𝜀(1 − 𝛼)𝑛஺(1 + 𝑔)஺ > 0. (29) 
  Therefore, we can obtain ௗఓ
ௗ௫
> 0  because of (22). 𝑘௧ାଵ஺ < 𝑘௧ାଵ஻   can be obtained temporally. 
                                                   
4 In the case of 𝑞ത = 0, 𝜏 > 0, 𝑥 > 0, fertility and education investment are 𝑛 = ఈ(ଵିఌ)(ଵିఛ)
௭̅
 and 𝑒௧ =
ఌ௭̅௪೟௛೟
(ଵିఌ)(ଵି௫)
. 
8 
 
Capital stock flow from country B to country A occurs. The share of total investment for capital stock 
in country A increases. However, the capital stock in 𝑡 + 1 period does not always increase. Total 
differentiation of (16) with respect to 𝑘௧ାଵ஺ , 𝑛஺, (1 + 𝑔௧)஺, 𝜇, 𝜏, and 𝑥, at the approximation of 
𝑥 = 0, ௗ௞೟శభ
ಲ
ௗఛ
 can be obtained as 
𝑑𝑘௧ାଵ஺
𝑑𝑥
=
𝑘௧ାଵ஺
𝜇
𝑑𝜇
𝑑𝑥
−
𝜇(1 − 𝛼)(1 − 𝜃)𝑘௧ఏ
𝑛஺(1 + 𝑔௧)஺
𝑑𝜏
𝑑𝑥
−
𝑘௧ାଵ஺
𝑛஺(1 + 𝑔௧)஺
𝑑𝑛஺(1 + 𝑔௧)஺
𝑑𝑥
. (30) 
The sign of ௗ௞೟శభ
ಲ
ௗ௫
  is ambiguous because ௞೟శభ
ಲ
ఓ
ௗఓ
ௗ௫
> 0 , ఓ(ଵିఈ)(ଵିఏ)௞೟
ഇ
௡ಲ(ଵା௚೟)ಲ
ௗఛ
ௗ௫
> 0 , 
௞೟శభಲ
௡ಲ(ଵା௚೟)ಲ
ௗ௡ಲ(ଵା௚೟)ಲ
ௗ௫
> 0. An increase in education subsidy reduces the capital stock per capita in 𝑡 +
1 period because of the tax burden and dilution effect, even if the investment for capital stock share 
𝜇 increases and generally ௗ௞೟శభ
ಲ
ௗ௫
< 0 is obtainable. Additionally, ௗ௞೟శభ
ಳ
ௗ௫
< 0 can be obtained because 
of (22). Then, considering (14), it is consistent with ௗ௞೟శభ
ಲ
ௗ௫
< 0. Therefore, the income growth rate in 
A country at 𝑡 + 1  period (1 + 𝑔௧)஺  decreases. As shown by (17), the income growth rate in 
country B at 𝑡 + 1 period (1 + 𝑔௧)஻ decreases. Then, the following proposition can be established. 
 
Proposition 2 
Education subsidies in country A reduces fertility in country A. The income growth rate in country A 
rises instantaneously. However, the income growth rate in country A decreases over time because of a 
decrease in physical capital stock. The income growth rate in country B decreases in 𝑡 + 1 period. 
 
An education subsidy in country A reduces income growth in country B because of capital flow from 
country B to country A. This result is not derived at the closed economy model and small open 
economy model. 
 
5. Conclusions 
This paper presents an examination of how the child care policy affects fertility and human capital 
accumulation. The related literature includes examination of the child care policy effects in the closed 
economy or a small open economy. No effect of policy from one country affects another country in a 
small open economy or a closed economy. However, considering capital mobility, the setting presented 
by this paper should be examined. Results demonstrate that the child care policy in one country 
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negatively or positively affects human capital accumulation in the other country. 
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